Embodied Non-Harm, Retreat Mind, and the Tick Story

Content

Dhamma Talk Outline — Embodied Non‑Harm, Retreat Mind, and the Tick Story
I. Opening (1–2 minutes)
• “Last time we talked about metta and the structure of retreat — the schedule, the rhythm, the container.”
• “Tonight I want to go a layer deeper: what actually happens inside when the mind has enough space for the dhammas to show themselves.”
• “This is about embodied non‑harm — not as a rule, but as something that arises naturally when the mind is quiet enough.”

II. Spirit Rock as Ethical Field (2–3 minutes)
• “Spirit Rock has its own ethics toward the land — toward the animals, the creatures, the quiet.”
• “The deer, the turkeys, the quail, the lizards… they behave differently there. Humans aren’t broadcasting threat.”
• “Retreat creates conditions where non‑harm isn’t an idea — it’s the atmosphere.”
• “When the mind settles into that atmosphere, it starts to see intention in very small moments.”

III. The Space for Dhammanupassanā (2–3 minutes)
• “On retreat, the mind has time. Time to slow down. Time to notice. Time to see the dhammas as they arise.”
• “Noticing aversion, noticing care, noticing uncertainty, noticing the lean toward the future — all of that becomes visible.”
• “This is dhammanupassanā in its natural habitat: not on the cushion, but in the ordinary movements of the day.”

IV. The Tick Story (5–6 minutes)
Set the scene:
• “I was walking the path near the bench labeled anicca — the one that overlooks the valley.”
• “I saw a tall stalk of grass with a tick clinging to it.”
The mind reveals itself:
• “First, a little aversion.”
• “Then care — I didn’t want someone brushing against it.”
• “Then uncertainty — I didn’t know what the right thing was.”
• “Then intention — non‑harm, as best as I could manage.”
• “I lifted the stalk gently and laid it down off the path.”
The humor:
• “And of course, I thought: that tick was probably my mother once.”
• “Humor can soften the mind around the truth of conditionality.”
The point:
• “It wasn’t a big moment. But it was a clear one. A moment where non‑harm wasn’t a rule — it was embodied.”

V. The Sutta — MN 136 (2–3 minutes)
Just enough for a fellow teacher to recognize it:
• “There’s a sutta — MN 136, the Mahākammavibhaṅga — where the Buddha warns against collapsing a single moment into a tidy story.”
• “He gives four cases:
◦ bad deed → bad result
◦ bad deed → good result
◦ good deed → good result
◦ good deed → bad result”
• “The point is: we simply don’t know the full karmic arc of any action.”
• “What we do know is our intention.”
• “That’s the only part we actually control.”
Tie it back:
• “That’s exactly what happened with the tick. I didn’t know the outcome. I didn’t pretend to know. I acted from non‑harm.”

VI. Ajahn Chah and “mai nae” (2 minutes)
• “Ajahn Chah used a phrase constantly: mai nae — ‘not sure,’ ‘uncertain,’ ‘not a sure thing.’”
• “He even said anicca can be understood as ‘uncertain.’”
• “Retreat teaches us to live inside mai nae — to act cleanly without needing certainty.”

VII. Bringing It Home (2–3 minutes)
• “Retreat gives us unusual conditions — quiet, simplicity, fewer inputs — so we can see the dhammas in small acts.”
• “The question is whether we can carry that clarity back into daily life, where everything pushes us toward quick conclusions.”
• “Can we act from non‑harm even when we don’t know the outcome?”
• “Can we stay with ‘not sure’ without collapsing into a story?”

VIII. Closing (1 minute)
• “If all you take from this talk is: try to be nicer to bugs, we’re good.”
• “But if you also take with you the sense that non‑harm can be embodied, and that uncertainty is not a problem but a teacher — that’s even better.”
• “May your practice meet you in the small moments.”

The Promise

Stay, I said
to the cut flowers.
They bowed
their heads lower.

Stay, I said to the spider,
who fled.

Stay, leaf.
It reddened,
embarrassed for me and itself.

Stay, I said to my body.
It sat as a dog does,
obedient for a moment,
soon starting to tremble.

Stay, to the earth
of riverine valley meadows,
of fossiled escarpments,
of limestone and sandstone.
It looked back
with a changing expression, in silence.

Stay, I said to my loves.
Each answered,
Always.

Jane Hirshfield
The four outcomes:

Bad conduct → hell. Kills, steals, commits sexual misconduct; uses false, divisive, harsh, or idle speech; covetous, malicious, wrong view → reborn in a bad place (hell).
Bad conduct → heaven. Same bad conduct → reborn in a good place (heaven).
Good conduct → heaven. Refrains from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct; avoids false, divisive, harsh, or idle speech; contented, kind-hearted, right view → reborn in a good place (heaven).
Good conduct → hell. Same good conduct → reborn in a bad place (hell).
Because conduct and rebirth don't map one-to-one. When a bad person is reborn in heaven, some _other_good deed (done earlier or later) ripens — or they took up right view at death. When a good person is reborn in hell, some other bad deed ripens — or they took up wrong view at death. And any given deed may ripen in this life, the next, or beyond — so what you observe at one moment isn't the whole picture.

That's why a clairvoyant who sees a single case and generalizes ("all bad people go to hell") is reasoning badly: hasty generalization plus post-hoc causation. The Buddha's "great analysis" is different because he sees which deed ripens when, and why. Hence the closing line: there are deeds that appear effective but aren't, and deeds that appear ineffective but are.

MN 136 – The Longer Analysis of Deeds (Mahākammavibhaṅga Sutta) The wanderer Potaliputta visits the junior monk Samiddhi, claiming the Buddha taught that bodily and verbal deeds are futile and only mental deeds are real. Samiddhi rejects this, but when asked what feeling follows an intentional deed of body, speech, or mind, he answers simply "suffering." Potaliputta leaves without responding; Samiddhi reports to Ānanda, and they go to the Buddha. The Buddha criticizes Samiddhi's categorical answer: Potaliputta was asking about the three feelings, and the correct reply is that pleasant, painful, and neutral deeds each produce their corresponding feeling. He then gives his "great analysis of deeds." There are four possible combinations: bad conduct with rebirth in hell; bad conduct with rebirth in heaven; good conduct with rebirth in heaven; and good conduct with rebirth in hell. He explains how ascetics who develop the divine eye observe a single case and wrongly generalize — "all who do bad deeds go to hell," "there is no such thing as bad deeds," etc. — each insisting their view alone is true. The Buddha grants the individual observations but rejects the universal claims: results depend on which deed ripens, including other deeds done previously or later, or the view undertaken at death, and deeds may ripen in this life, the next, or beyond. Hence there are deeds that appear effective but aren't, and vice versa — apparent karmic outcomes cannot be taken as proof of simple one-to-one causation.

Middle Discourses 136

The Longer Analysis of Deeds

So I have heard. At one time the Buddha was staying near Rājagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the squirrels’ feeding ground.

Now at that time Venerable Samiddhi was staying in a wilderness hut. Then as the wanderer Potaliputta was going for a walk he came up to Venerable Samiddhi and exchanged greetings with him. This is the only time we meet Potaliputta. His name suggests he hails from the capital of Assaka, variously spelled Potali or Potana (DN 19:36.4). | As for Samiddhi, see note on MN 133:1.3. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side and said to him:

“Reverend Samiddhi, I have heard and learned this in the presence of the ascetic Gotama: ‘Deeds by way of body and speech are done in vain. Only mental deeds are real.’ And: ‘There is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.’”

“Don’t say that, Reverend Potaliputta, don’t say that! Don’t misrepresent the Buddha, for misrepresentation of the Buddha is not good. And the Buddha would not say this: ‘Deeds by way of body and speech are done in vain. Only mental deeds are real.’ There is indeed no such statement in the suttas. But, reverend, there is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.” This is the cessation of perception and feelings.

“Reverend Samiddhi, how long has it been since you went forth?”

“Not long, reverend: three years.”

“Well now, what are we to say to the senior mendicants, when even such a junior mendicant imagines their Teacher needs defending? After doing an intentional deed by way of body, speech, or mind, reverend, what does one feel?”

“After doing an intentional deed by way of body, speech, or mind, reverend, one feels suffering.” It is this answer of Samiddhi’s that is criticized below. Then, neither approving nor rejecting Samiddhi’s statement, Potaliputta rose from his seat and left.

Soon after he had left, Venerable Samiddhi went to Venerable Ānanda, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side, and informed Ānanda of all they had discussed.

When he had spoken, Ānanda said to him, “Reverend Samiddhi, we should see the Buddha about this matter. Come, let’s go to the Buddha and inform him about this. As he answers, so we’ll remember it.”

“Yes, reverend,” Samiddhi replied.

Then Ānanda and Samiddhi went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one side, and told him what had happened.

When they had spoken, the Buddha said to Ānanda, “I don’t recall even seeing the wanderer Potaliputta, Ānanda, so how could we have had such a discussion? The wanderer Potaliputta’s question should have been answered after analyzing it, but this futile man answered categorically.”

When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But perhaps, sir, Venerable Samiddhi spoke in reference to the statement: ‘Suffering includes whatever is felt.’”

But the Buddha said to Venerable Ānanda, “See what this futile man Udāyī comes up with? There are several monks named Udāyī and it is not easy to distinguish them. One of them was known for his stupidity (AN 6.29:3.3). | Ummagga is from ummujjati, just below, “uprising, emergence”. I knew that he was coming up with something irrational. Right from the start Potaliputta asked about the three feelings. Suppose the futile man Samiddhi had answered the wanderer Potaliputta’s question like this: ‘After doing an intentional deed to be experienced as pleasant by way of body, speech, or mind, one feels pleasure. After doing an intentional deed to be experienced as painful by way of body, speech, or mind, one feels pain. After doing an intentional deed to be experienced as neutral by way of body, speech, or mind, one feels neutral.’ Answering in this way, Samiddhi would have rightly answered Potaliputta.

Still, who are those foolish and incompetent wanderers of other religions to understand the Realized One’s great analysis of deeds? If you would all listen, Ānanda, I will explain the Realized One’s great analysis of deeds.” Text here reads vibhajantassa, which appears ungrammatical. This phrase is shared with AN 6.62:5.8, which is also a case where a junior monk has made a silly statement. There the Pali has vibhajissāmi (“I will explain”). The commentary does not explicitly comment on this phrase, but it does say that the Buddha thought, “I will make it clear for the mendicant Saṅgha” (bhikkhusaṅghassa pākaṭaṁ karissāmīti), which implies that it was reading the future tense. Compare the use of future tense in the stock phrase, “Listen and apply your mind well, I will speak” (MN 138:2.2).

“Now is the time, Blessed One! Now is the time, Holy One! Let the Buddha explain the great analysis of deeds. The mendicants will listen and remember it.”

“Well then, Ānanda, listen and apply your mind well, I will speak.”

“Yes, sir,” Ānanda replied. The Buddha said this:

“Ānanda, these four individuals are found in the world. What four? It’s when an individual here kills living creatures, steals, and commits sexual misconduct. They use speech that’s false, backbiting, harsh, or nonsensical. And they’re covetous, malicious, and have wrong view. When their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell.

But some other individual here kills living creatures, steals, and commits sexual misconduct. They use speech that’s false, backbiting, harsh, or nonsensical. And they’re covetous, malicious, and have wrong view. When their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm.

But some other individual here refrains from killing living creatures, stealing, sexual misconduct, or using speech that’s false, divisive, harsh, or nonsensical. And they’re contented, kind-hearted, with right view. When their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm.

Now, some ascetic or brahmin—by dint of keen, resolute, committed, and diligent effort, and right application of mind—experiences an immersion of the heart of such a kind that it gives rise to clairvoyance that is purified and superhuman. With that clairvoyance they see that individual Meditation is described in the same way at DN 1:1.31.1, which is also concerned with those who draw inaccurate inferences from deep meditation. here who killed living creatures, stole, and committed sexual misconduct; who used speech that’s false, backbiting, harsh, or nonsensical; and who was covetous, malicious, and had wrong view. And they see that, when their body breaks up, after death, they are reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. They say: ‘It seems, worthy sir, that there is such a thing as bad deeds, and the result of bad conduct. The use of kira (“seems”) conveys an appropriate degree of caution when framing a hypothesis. But as we shall see, the theorist does not maintain this. For I have seen a individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And when their body broke up, after death, they were reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell.’ Having framed their hypothesis, the theorist presents their supporting observations. They say: ‘It seems that everyone who kills living creatures … and has wrong view is reborn in hell. Now the theorist draws their inference, committing two logical fallacies. One is the fallacy of hasty generalization: the fact that some people who do bad deeds go to hell does not imply that all people who do bad deeds go to hell. The second is the post hoc fallacy: the fact that the bad deed preceded rebirth in hell does not imply that the bad deed caused rebirth in hell. The Buddha avoids the fallacy of hasty generalization by surveying a much larger, statistically significant scope, said to be ninety-one eons (MN 71:14.2). And he avoids the post hoc fallacy by flipping the causal arrow: if the presence of kamma leads to rebirth, then the absence of kamma should lead to the ending of rebirth. By practicing to realize the ending of kamma he confirmed this for himself. Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ Leaving behind caution and going beyond observation, the theorist now asserts that the results of their reasoning are the truth. | Here words from the root √ñā are used for both right and wrong ideas. Normally I translate √ñā as “knowledge”, but in English one cannot “know” something false. One might believe that it is nighttime when it is in fact the day, but one cannot know this. Usually √ñā does have the positive sense of “true knowledge”, but when dealing with errant theorizers we also find it used for “false knowledge”, in which case I use “notion” (eg. Snp 4.13:17.2). And so they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile.’ Contemplatives sometimes deprecate logic as inferior to meditative insight. By not exercising the critical skills to evaluate and improve their reasoning, they become especially prone to using poor logic. The brilliance of meditative experiences can be overwhelming and it is easy to be convinced of the truth of one’s inferences, without even recognizing them as inferences. Sutta passages such as this show that the interpretation of meditative experiences must be tempered with clear logic.

But some other ascetic or brahmin—by dint of keen, resolute, committed, and diligent effort, and right application of mind—experiences an immersion of the heart of such a kind that it gives rise to clairvoyance that is purified and superhuman. With that clairvoyance they see that individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And they see that they are reborn in a heavenly realm. They say: ‘It seems that there is no such thing as bad deeds, and the result of bad conduct. For I have seen an individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And I saw that they were reborn in a heavenly realm.’ They say: ‘It seems that everyone who kills living creatures … and has wrong view is reborn in a heavenly realm. Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ And so they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile.’

Take some ascetic or brahmin who with clairvoyance sees an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And they see that they are reborn in a heavenly realm. They say: ‘It seems that there is such a thing as good deeds, and the result of good conduct. For I have seen an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And I saw that they were reborn in a heavenly realm.’ They say: ‘It seems that everyone who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view is reborn in a heavenly realm. Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ And so they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile.’

Take some ascetic or brahmin who with clairvoyance sees an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And they see that they are reborn in hell. They say: ‘It seems that there is no such thing as good deeds, and the result of good conduct. For I have seen an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And I saw that they were reborn in hell.’ They say: ‘It seems that everyone who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view is reborn in hell. Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ And so they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile.’

In this case, when an ascetic or brahmin says this: ‘It seems that there is such a thing as bad deeds, and the result of bad conduct,’ I grant them that. And when they say: ‘I have seen an individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And after death, they were reborn in hell,’ I also grant them that. But when they say: ‘It seems that everyone who kills living creatures … and has wrong view is reborn in hell,’ I don’t grant them that. And when they say: ‘Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ I also don’t grant them that. And when they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile,’ I also don’t grant them that. Why is that? Because the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.

In this case, when an ascetic or brahmin says this: ‘It seems that there is no such thing as bad deeds, and the result of bad conduct,’ I don’t grant them that. But when they say: ‘I have seen an individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And I saw that they were reborn in a heavenly realm,’ I grant them that. But when they say: ‘It seems that everyone who kills living creatures … and has wrong view is reborn in a heavenly realm,’ I don’t grant them that. … Because the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.

In this case, when an ascetic or brahmin says this: ‘It seems that there is such a thing as good deeds, and the result of good conduct,’ I grant them that. And when they say: ‘I have seen an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And I saw that they were reborn in a heavenly realm,’ I also grant them that. But when they say: ‘It seems that everyone who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view is reborn in a heavenly realm,’ I don’t grant them that. … Because the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.

In this case, when an ascetic or brahmin says this: ‘It seems that there is no such thing as good deeds, and the result of good conduct,’ I don’t grant them that. But when they say: ‘I have seen an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And after death, they were reborn in hell,’ I grant them that. But when they say: ‘It seems that everyone who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view is reborn in hell,’ I don’t grant them that. But when they say: ‘Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion,’ I also don’t grant them that. And when they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile,’ I also don’t grant them that. Why is that? Because the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.

Now, Ānanda, take the case of the individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view, and who, when their body breaks up, after death, is reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. That bad deed of theirs that is to be experienced as painful was either done previously, or later, or else at the time of death they undertook wrong view. The logic of this passage seems to be: “When a good result follows a bad deed, or bad follows good, then they must have done some other fitting deed at another time; and even if a bad result follows a bad deed, or good follows good, it is still possible that the result was caused by some other fitting deed.” But the phrasing of the Pali does not quite say this. I suspect that some nuance has been lost, perhaps due to over-zealous standardization. | For deathbed kamma see MN 97:38.7 and note. And that’s why, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. But anyone here who kills living creatures … and has wrong view experiences the result of that in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.

Now, Ānanda, take the case of the individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view, and who is reborn in a heavenly realm. That good deed of theirs that is to be experienced as pleasurable was either done previously, or later, or else at the time of death they undertook right view. And that’s why, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. But anyone here who kills living creatures … and has wrong view experiences the result of that in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.

Now, Ānanda, take the case of the individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view, and who is reborn in a heavenly realm. That good deed of theirs that is to be experienced as pleasurable was either done previously, or later, or else at the time of death they undertook right view. And that’s why, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. But anyone here who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view experiences the result of that in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.

Now, Ānanda, take the case of the individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view, and who is reborn in hell. That bad deed of theirs that is to be experienced as painful was either done previously, or later, or else at the time of death they undertook wrong view. And that’s why, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. But anyone here who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view experiences the result of that in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.

So, Ānanda, there are deeds that are ineffective and appear ineffective. There are deeds that are ineffective but appear effective. There are deeds that are effective and appear effective. And there are deeds that are effective but appear ineffective.”

That is what the Buddha said. Satisfied, Venerable Ānanda approved what the Buddha said.

Embodied Non-Harm, Retreat Mind, and the Tick Story

Content

Related Notes

The Promise

The Longer Analysis of Deeds